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Abstract
This paper proposes to address new requirements of confidentiality, integrity and availability properties  
fitting to peer-to-peer domains of resources. The enforcement of security properties in an open peer-to-
peer  network  remains  an  open  problem  as  the  literature  have  mainly  proposed  contribution  on  
availability of resources and anonymity of users. That paper proposes a novel architecture that eases the 
administration of a peer-to-peer network. It considers a network of safe peer-to-peer clients in the sense  
that it is a commune client software that is shared by all the participants to cope with the sharing of  
various resources  associated with different  security  requirements.  However,  our  proposal deals with  
possible malicious peers that attempt to compromise the requested security properties. Despite the safety  
of an open peer-to-peer network cannot be formally guaranteed, since a end user has privileges on the  
target host, our solution provides several advanced security enforcement. First, it enables to formally  
define the requested security properties of the various shared resources. Second, it evaluates the trust  
and the reputation of the requesting peer by sending challenges that test the fairness of its peer-to-peer  
security policy. Moreover, it proposes an advanced Mandatory Access Control that enforces the required  
peer-to-peer  security  properties  through  an  automatic  projection  of  the  requested  properties  onto  
SELinux  policies.  Thus,  the  SELinux  system of  the  requesting peer  is  automatically  configured  with 
respect to the required peer-to-peer security properties. That solution prevents from a malicious peer that  
could use ordinary applications  such as  a video reader  to  access  confidential  files  such as  a video  
requesting fee paying. Since the malicious peer could try to abuse the system, SELinux challenges and  
traces are also used to evaluate the fairness of the requester. That paper ends with different research  
perspectives such as a dedicated MAC system for the peer-to-peer client and honeypots for testing the  
security of the proposed peer-to-peer infrastructure.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Historically,  peer to peer softwares have been used to exchange files in order to bypass the 
limitations of centralized solutions. New problems arise when using peer to peer clients. First, 
the  usage  of  these  software  are  commonly  associated  to  the  idea  that  these  exchanges  are 
illegals, regarding the copyright violation [16]. If a user publishes a copyrighted file, the peer-
to-peer system cannot prevent the spread of this file. Second, the peers are supposed to respect 
security requirements in order to guarantee some fairness in the network. For example, a peer is 
not supposed to download files without sharing its own files.
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Security  properties,  i.e.  confidentiality,  integrity,  availability  are  partially  addressed  in  the 
literature. The focus is limited to the availability and confidentiality properties. The existing 
peer-to-peer  architectures  try  to  hide  the  user’s  activity  in  order  to  obtain  a  good level  of 
anonymity. Moreover, the resources must remain available in the peer-to-peer network even if 
peers are faulty or try to abuse the protocol. On the contrary, the integrity property is poorly 
addressed: most of the papers considers integrity as the ability to transfer a file and to guaranty 
that it is identical to the original resource. But in practice, the user needs to specify how they 
want to share the resources in a more flexible way.  Moreover, different security policies are 
required for various domains of usage.
This paper proposes a way to specify and enforce a flexible policy in order to allow the users to 
manage the required security properties in a peer-to-peer network. It covers properties such as 
confidentiality (the resource of a community is shared and stays in this community), integrity 
(some resource that needs integrity must not be modified even if shared between users) and 
availability  (the  resources  that  must  be  available  must  be  spread  over  the  peers).  A  new 
language is proposed for formalizing the requested security properties by introducing the notion 
of domains. That language enables to define the security policies of the different peers that can 
formally  express  their  goals  about  the  various  resources  they  have.  When  conflicts  appear 
between peers about the policies they have, a decision is taken by the resource’s holder to send 
or not the resource to the requester. This paper shows how the decision can be taken using the 
analysis of the peer’s policies.
If we consider a peer-to-peer network where all the peers honor the protocol and respect the 
security policies, the properties attached to resources will be respected even if the resources are 
exchanged in the network. Of course, a peer-to-peer network could have malicious peers that 
can  try  to  abuse  the  protocol,  which  is  the  main  issue  that  is  treated  in  the  literature  and 
described in section 2. As our proposal is based on the negotiation of policies, the malicious 
peers  could  claim  a  policy  they  do  not  respect  or  ensure.  Solutions  for  this  problem are 
presented. It uses a real operating system security enforcement and a distant evaluation of the 
conformity of the claimed policy using various challenges and logs for both the peer-to-peer 
client and the operating system.
A prototype of a peer-to-peer Java client have been implemented using the JXTA technology. It 
implements our negotiation protocol and the enforcement of the requested policy through an 
automatic configuration of the target SELinux system. Simulations of our negotiation protocol 
is presented and real use cases of our peer-to-peer client are given.
2. STATE OF THE ART
The ancestors  of  distributed  peer-to-peer  systems  are  solutions  with  a  centralized  index  of 
published resources. A peer can request the server in order to find resources owned by a peer it 
does  not  know.  Then,  the  shared  resource  is  exchanged  from the  identified  source  to  the 
requesting peer. Other solutions with clusters of servers increase the reliability of the solution as 
in Kazaa networks. The next generation of peer-to-peer systems are totally distributed [13]. The 
index  of  published  resources  is  ensured  by  the  peers  themselves  [3,  6].  This  avoids  the 
reliability problem of the older peer-to-peer systems  but introduces a loss of  control  on the 
publication and the exchanges. Therefore, a strong effort has been done to hide activities of 
these peer-to-peer systems [1, 5, 6, 10], but it is a very limited notion of security. This section 
presents how the security is addressed in the literature of peer to peer systems.
2.1. Confidentiality and Anonymity
The confidentiality property have been interpreted in different ways in the literature. The first 
effort in the first peer-to-peer networks was focused on anonymity of users [6, 7, 12], mainly to 
escape censorship or to be protected when downloading copyrighted resources. This anonymity 
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is enforced by the protocol that allows the content of the message request to be encrypted to 
intermediary  nodes.  Several  versions  of  this  protocol  [10,  6]  have  been  proposed  and  are 
derivations of Chaum’s mix protocol [4]. Another benefit of the encryption of the data is the 
integrity of the messages that can be verified by the recipient peer.
The use of relays can help the intermediary nodes for their own anonymity.  As they acts as 
relays, they can hide their own activities inside the relayed requests. It becomes impossible to 
know if  a  node  is  acting  for  himself  or  for  another  nodes.  This  is  called  hiding  or  anti-
censorship system [5]. The classical countermeasure in case of a tentative of hiding is to analyze 
the traffic flow of a node. An Internet Service Provider could try to analyze the IP packets in 
order to build a profile of the exchanged data [8]. The analysis could use information such as 
used ports, TCP or UDP protocols, the amount of flow that is exchanged [18].
2.2. Availability
Another classical property that a peer-to-peer system tries to guarantee is the availability of the 
resources, mainly in case of fail stop fault. The technical solutions for this issue rely on data 
replication: for example in GNUNet [11],  the addresses and resources are duplicated on the 
neighbors of the node responsible of the resources. The resource’s ownership is based on the 
hashcode of the file: the peers are organized in a binary tree and the file will be stored in the leaf 
whose binary number is the closest of the hashcode. Then, the neighbourhood will be the closest 
nodes of this leaf in the tree [3]. When a request is addressed to the node that is known as the 
closest node of the resource, it will eventually forward the request to a node it knows closest. 
The requester obtains a pool of peers that are closed to the resource. This pool guarantees a 
good availability of the resource even in case of failure or disconnection.
Other peer to peer file systems use different kind of DHT (Distributed hash table) like Chord [9] 
that uses a ring distribution of peers or more sophisticated organizations like in Can [17] that 
uses  a  multidimensional  space.  These  solutions  ensure  the  same  kind  of  availability. 
Performance storage or resource localization as well as management of files and their issues are 
outside the scope of this paper.
2.3. Integrity
Several definitions of the integrity property exists. In [15] a comparison is done on the different 
definitions usually used. In peer-to-peer systems the integrity property can be interpreted as two 
different requirements:
• the concept of data quality: the resources must meet or exceed the quality expected by 
the user.
• the prevention of unauthorized modification of data.
For the data quality, the first peer-to-peer systems used metadata such as test comments or tags 
reported by the users. These reports are difficult to evaluate and easily exploited by a malicious 
node,  even if  sophisticated correlation algorithms try to aggregate comments  to identify the 
good resources and to exclude fakes.
For  the  integrity  of  the  exchanged  data,  the  protocols  often  combines  anonymity  and 
verification when using cryptographic keys to encrypt the requests and responses. One of the 
most known protocol that provides integrity of messages in ECRS [14] which is a variant of the 
CHK encoding scheme used in Freenet. The principle of ECRS is to provide a way to encrypt 
the response that will return from an unknown node to the initiator of the request. This way, the 
node that  sent  the  request  can  check  that  the  node that  answered  as  really a  resource  that 
matches the request and are not a malicious node that have intercepted the request and altered 
the information.
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Other  peer-to-peer  systems  have  been  proposed  to  manage  the  modification  of  a  resource 
(OceanStore, Ivy and Pastis). It can be seen as a sort of access control systems that allows the 
publisher of the resource to control who is authorized to update the resource. In Pastis,  the 
owner can delegate the write permission to a group of peers. These proposals are the first steps 
of the integrity property. The frameworks are complex to deploy as they rely on cryptographic 
keys and signatures that have to be deployed after having authenticated the participating peer-
to-peer nodes.
2.4. Discussion
Existing solutions suffer from several major limitations :
• opened peer-to-peer networks cannot be controlled. Indeed, each peer has local root 
privileges that authorize all the possible resource or protocol compromising. Thus, each 
peer can abuse the others about the enforcement of the security that it  offers to the 
others.
• they  do  not  address  advanced  security  properties  but  only  limited  ones  such  as 
anonymity,  confidentiality  and  integrity  of  messages.  Integrity,  confidentiality  and 
availability of domains is missing. Moreover, relationships between the domains is not 
addressed.
• definition of security properties  is  not  permitted.  Thus,  a peer  cannot  announce the 
proposed security policy.
• evaluation of  the  enforcement  of  the proposed security policy is  not  supported.  So, 
attempts to abuse the system cannot be detected.
• conflicts between distant security policies must be resolved in order to authorize the 
resource exchange.
• finally,  one  cannot  find  any  model  of  trust  that  evaluates  the  reputation  of  a  peer 
according to the requested security properties such as integrity and confidentiality of 
domains.
The following sections address those different limitations in order to propose a new model to 
express and enforce a larger range of security properties in relation with various domains of 
usage.  Moreover,  evaluation strategies proposed to cope with conflicting but  also malicious 
peers.
3. SECURITY LANGUAGE
Each peer  can  have  a  great  number  of  resources.  To  simplify  their  management,  they  are 
grouped together into domains to which are applied a set of security properties. The security 
policy of a peer is composed of all its domains and security properties.
3.1. Domains
A domain d is defined as a unity of organization that groups multiple resources which have the 
same set of security properties. The concept of domain is quite opened because it depends of the 
community that will define the domains. Our basic example is to consider three domains : a free 
domain, a fee paying domain, and a private company domain.
The free domain defines a group of resources that can be exchanged without any restriction. The 
fee paying domain defines the resources that need the payment of fees in order to have access to 
these resources. The private domain defines private medias. When a resource is published on 
the peer-to-peer network (it is the first time the resource is added), the resource is necessarily 
associated to a domain, as described later in section 3.4.
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3.2. Operation on domains
A peer  creates  a  domain  when requested  by the  user.  A  domain  will  contain  downloaded 
resources and is empty at the beginning. The user will discover the existence of a domain, for 
example on the web, and will ask to the peer-to-peer client to create the domain. The deletion of 
a useless domain can be requested by the user. In this case, all the resources of the domain 
should be dropped.
3.3. Security properties
Integrity, confidentiality and availability are general properties which need to be adapted to peer 
to peer networks. Indeed, they are fully opened, decentralized and sometimes anonymous, so it 
is a challenge to define and to insure a specific security property for a given resource. Our 
architecture  supports  two kinds  of  properties  :  negative  rules  and  positive  rules  which  are 
prohibition properties and permission properties.
3.3.1. Prohibition properties
Intuitively,  a  prohibition property can be “the resource must  not  change of  domain”  and a 
permission property “the resource is encouraged to change of domain”. Prohibition properties 
are basically the removal of rights in the peer-to-peer network. By default, a request have to be 
honoured because the goal  of  a peer-to-peer network is  to exchange files between users.  A 
policy that promotes prohibition properties tries to reduce the freedom of the users, in order to 
guarantee properties that are conflicting with the freedom property.
Confidentiality The confidentiality property expresses that the resources of a domain must be 
maintained in this domain over the peer-to-peer network. This is not the classical definition of 
the confidentiality property as it does not answer the question “who can access the resource over 
the peer-to-peer network ?”. That means that our goal is not to restrict the access of the resource 
to a set of users (the users are not known in advance in an open peer-to-peer network). Our goal 
is to guarantee that the resources stay associated to the considered domain.
confidentiality(d1): no resources can exit domain d1.
confidentiality(o1): resource o1 must not exit its current domain. 
For example, the property is useful for the fee paying and a private company domain, that want 
that their files stay in their respective domains:
confidentiality(fee_paying)
confidentiality(private_company_A)
Moreover, the confidentiality property can be less restrictive if considering two domains that 
exclude each other: confidentiality(d1, d2) : a resource of domain d1 must not be  able to be 
written in domain d2. For example, the property is useful to express that the fee paying domain 
must not share resources that will reach the free domain:
confidentiality(fee_paying, free)
confidentiality(private_company_A, {free, fee_paying})
The confidentiality property does not prohibit a resource to be shared as long as it stays in the 
same domain. Next, we introduce a property that prohibit the sharing.
No share property The no share property expresses the need of prohibiting the share of the 
resource with another peer on the peer-to-peer network. The resource can eventually change of 
domain on the same peer, but the peer must try to guaranty that the resource will not be sent to 
another peer. 
noshare(d1): the resources in domain d1 must not be shared anymore.
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noshare(o1): the resource o1 must not be shared anymore.
This property can be used when a resource is sent by peer A to peer B in order to request that 
peer B does not share that resource. In this case, peer A allows peer B to get the resource but 
request the noshare property from peer B:
noshare(movie_file)
Integrity The integrity property aims to guaranty that the resources of a domain will not be 
modified by a peer.
integrity(d1): resources in domain d1 must not be modified.
integrity(o1): resources o1 must not be modified.
For example, a PDF file is broadcasted over the peer-to-peer network and the author requires 
that the file will not be modified by any peer that gets a copy of it:
integrity(report.pdf)
No publication The no publication property aims to guaranty that no resource will be published 
into a given domain. 
nopublication(d1): no resource in domain d1 must be published. 
For example, a peer can decide that the domain fee paying will only be used to download files 
and that it has no reason to publish files into this domain:
nopublication(fee_paying)
3.3.2. Permission properties
The presented prohibition properties restrict the freedom of the users: the global policies of the 
resources will become more and more strict. The worst case is the no share property that forbid 
definitively a  peer  to  exchange a  resource.  To counterbalance these  rules  that  can lead the 
system in  a  freezed  state,  we  introduce  permission  properties  that  can  be  seen  as  positive 
properties that help the users to exchange files. This is a way to reenforce the freedom of users 
to share resources with its community.
Cooperation Two companies could be interested in setting up a strong cooperation between 
them.  Each company can create a private domain and will  probably use the  confidentiality 
property in  order  to  protect  their  own  data.  In  contrast,  two domains  can  cooperate  if  the 
resources can easily be shared between them.
cooperation(d1, d2): all resources of domain d1 must be available for sharing into domain d2.
cooperation(o1, d2): resource o1 must be available for sharing into domain d2. 
For two companies A and B using private company A and private company B as domains, the 
peers of these companies can setup these properties to authorize any sharing of private data:
cooperation(private company A, private company B)
cooperation(private company B, private company A)
Spread The  spread  property  is  a  generalization  of  the  cooperation  property.  The  idea  of 
spreading a resource is that the owner of the resource wants the resource to be spread as much 
as possible on the peer-to-peer network, copied into the same or other domains.
spread(d1): all resources of domain d1 must be available as much as possible and shared with 
other domains.
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spread(o1): resource o1 must be available as much as possible and shared with other domains. 
For example, security patches could be spread on the domain kernel patch for the linux kernel:
spread(kernel_patch)
3.3.3. Operation on properties
There are two ways  of updating security properties.  A user can decide to add or remove  a 
security property for a domain or a file. The second case is when the peer receives a request 
from the owner of a resource to modify its policy. These two situations can generate conflicts of 
properties.
3.3.4. Conflicting properties
Security properties can be added to a resource or to a domain.  Each update can bring up a 
situation of conflicting properties. The table 1 shows if rule r1 can conflict with rule r2. In case 
of conflict, a decision must be taken to select one of the two rules or to perform more general 
modifications of the policy.
Table 1.  Conflicting properties.
r1 / r2 Conf. Integ. Spread No pub. No share. Coop.
Confidentiality x x
Integrity
Spread x x
No publication
No share x x
Cooperation x x
3.4. Publication
The publication  of  a  resource  can  be done by any peer  in  the  system.  When publishing a 
resource, the user chooses a domain where to drop it. The peer-to-peer client will check the 
policy in order to detect a possible violation, for example a nopublication rule concerning the 
targeted domain. When a user performs a publication, the domain’s file is not published across 
the network but only the name of the file and its location are sent. The mechanism of storing 
and  retrieving  the  resource  are  managed  as  in  classical  peer-to-peer  networks  and  are  not 
addressed in this paper.
Moreover, the peer will eventually add new security properties for the considered resource to 
the local policy. The publication will have this form:
publish(security properties, resource, targeted domain)
For example, when publishing a report, a user of company A will ask to the peer-to-peer client:
publish({confidentiality, integrity}, reportA.pdf, private_company_A)
The confidentiality property is already ensured by the properties of domain private company A 
in listing 1: there is no need to add another confidentiality property. For the integrity property, a 
new rule integrity(reportA.pdf) will be added on peer A to get a satisfying security policy.
Domains: free, fee paying, private_company_A
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confidentiality(fee paying)
confidentiality(private company A)
integrity(reportA.pdf)
cooperation(private company A, private company B)
Listing 1. Domains and security properties of peer A.
4. PEER-TO-PEER NEGOTIATIONS
The described security language allows a peer-to-peer client to express the properties that he 
wants to apply on its resources. This is crucial for the resources that the peer wants to share on 
the network. But this language is also used when two peers are negotiating for an exchange. The 
principles of a negotiation between a peer A (pA), owner of a resource, and an asking peer B 
(pB) is described in this section.
4.1. Negotiation basics
First the peer pB sends a request to pA for a file on a target domain called dB. The asked 
resource is situated in a domain dA that could be different of dB. In fact, two situations are 
possible:
• The two peers know each other or have previously exchanged information about the 
domain they will use to share data. It means that both peers knows the string that will be 
used as domain’s name, i.e. dA = dB.
• The two peers have never met before. It means that the peer pB does not know the name 
of the domain dA where is situated the resource r. As a consequence, dA ≠ dB.
If dA = dB, the peer B have probably applied the same policy to the domain dB, to be consistent 
with peer A. This way, the negotiation will have the best chance to succeed, as the peer A will 
have the guaranty that the policy applied to its resource will stay guaranteed when the resource 
will be exchanged with B. Nevertheless, even if the domain’s names are the same, the policies 
applied to both domains could be different.
Thus, pA will ask pB to send the part of its policy that is currently applied to the domain dB. 
Indeed, the peer B as no reason to send its whole policy to peer A. The peer B does not want to 
reveal the rules that are applied to other domains he created. Only the rules applied to dB are 
needed in the negotiation because they will be associated to the resource after the exchange. The 
peer pA will be able to check if the received policy hurts the policy attached to the domain dA. 
For this purpose, the Table 1 is used to determine if one of the proposed property of domain db 
enters in conflicting with one of those of the domain dB.
A basic decision is to decline the request of exchange if any property of dB hurts a property of 
dA. This way,  the peer pA is sure to preserve the properties on the resources of dA. If the 
domain dA as no property,  the peer cannot hurts the policy of A and the peer pB is free to 
propose any new property on the domain pB. Thus, a peer has the possibility to make evolve its 
policy for the considered resource: each pear, that requests a resource, can add a new property, 
if this property does not enter in conflict with the previous associated properties. For example, if 
a  property spread(d)  is  attached to  a resource,  a  peer  will  not  be  able  to  add the  property 
confidentiality(d) because the peer that owns the resource will refuse the transfer.
4.2. Negotiation with malicious peers
For properties that deal with security, we should evaluate if the proposal resists to attacks that 
try to defeat the security mechanisms. To defeat the mechanism, a malicious peer can announce 
any security properties to the other peers. Nevertheless, two cases must be distinguished:
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• if  the  malicious  peer  have  no  information  about  the  properties  associated  with  the 
requested resource, it will probably fail negotiating with the owner because the proposal 
will hurt the owner policy.
• if the malicious peer knows precisely what policy is required for the requested resource, 
it can claim to ensure the same properties on the target domain, even if it will not honor 
those properties later on.
Obviously, in a general manner, one can never prevent a malicious peer to simulate a satisfying 
behaviour. However, simulating a correct behaviour becomes difficult when the malicious peer:
1. must guess the requested policy, 
2. is submitted to challenges
3. is automatically configured to enforce the requested policy using a MAC system such as 
SELinux that protects that peer at the Operating System scale. 
The  next  section  describes  how  to  compute  challenges  and  evaluate  the  accuracy  of  the 
response.
4.3. Evaluating the fairness of a peer
4.3.1. Evaluation of the proposed policy
The proposed policy could be evaluated regarding the possible conflicts  with the  requested 
policy.  When the peer receives the proposed policy from the requester,  it  will  check if the 
proposed policy is conflicting with each property of the proposed policy:
• -1 : the property is clearly violated by the policy;
• 0 : the property is not provided by the policy;
• 1 : the property is respected.
A basic  scenario is  to  sum the evaluations  to  obtain a  global  score.  If  positive,  the  global 
evaluation is positive. It means that most of the properties are respected by the requester of the 
resource and that some of them may be violated.
4.3.2. History
The peer that owns the requested resource might ask a part of the history file of the operations 
that  the  requester  did.  This  is  a  way  to  check  if  the  requester  is  respecting  the  policy  it 
proclaims. This log file could also be a fake log file, but it is a difficult task to provide a fake 
log file that is coherent with all other parties in a distributed systems. For example, a malicious 
peer can simulate the existence and transactions with a fake peer but the peer that evaluates the 
history can check if the fake peer exists or has been viewed in the past. A proposal of evaluation 
of the history during a given time t is given below:
• -1 : at least one log record indicates that the policy has been violated during t;
• -2 : the property has been violated before t;
• 1 : no infraction has been viewed.
Again, these figures can be combined to get a global score about the evaluation of the history 
file of the evaluated peer. Evaluation of an history is reduced to the past. In order to have a real 
time view of the reliability of requester, challenges are described in the following section. As 
detailed in the sequel, our architecture enforces the requested peer-to-peer security properties 
using SELinux policies. So, the history also includes some SELinux traces such as the SELinux 
trace corresponding to the attempt to open a protected resource using a malicious application 
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e.g. vim for opening a confidential file.  Further details will  be given in the experimentation 
section.
4.3.3. Challenges
These challenges are delegated to the peers that A trusts. Thus, it becomes more difficult for a 
malicious peer to answer accordingly to the various peers because it will try to be consistent 
with conflicting challenges. In order to improve the evaluation, a trusted peer C will first send 
conflicting requests to peer B in order to make it change its policy accordingly. For example, C 
will request the spread property that is conflicting with the confidentiality property requested by 
A for the same domain. Afterwards, C will send challenges to A for evaluating the response to 
the transfer challenges. The purpose of that paper is not to choose between the best way to 
evaluate the response to the challenge, since various trust measurements exist in the literature, 
but to propose an overall architecture that aims at reusing existing trust formulas to evaluate the 
response to challenges. In the sequel, simulation runs present the evaluation of the challenges 
carried out by the trusted distant peers.
Since our architecture enforces the requested peer-to-peer security properties using SELinux 
policies, the proposed challenges include some SELinux challenges such as the request for the 
distant  peer  to  try to  open a  protected  resource using  a  malicious  application e.g.  vim for 
opening  a  confidential  file.  Further  explanation  will  be  given  in  the  sequel  about  those 
mechanisms.
4.3.4. Reputation
The peer A computes the evaluations, carried out during the challenge phase, in order to define 
a  challenge  for  the  requesting  peer  B.  Thus,  the  various  distributed  challenges  enable  to 
compute an overall reputation for the requesting peer B. Various mathematical measurements 
from the literature can be reused to evaluate the reputation of a peer B. The purpose of that 
paper is not to choose between the best mathematical formulas to evaluate the reputation, but to 
give a  global  architecture  that  can reuse efficiently the  existing reputation formulas.  In  the 
sequel, simulation of reputation measurements are described.
5. ENFORCING THE SECURITY PROPERTIES AT THE OS LEVEL
After  the  evaluation of  the security policy presented in the  previous  section,  the remaining 
security pitfalls deal with the local attacks carried out both at peer A and peer B sides. Let us 
assume  a  corrupted  web  navigator  that  could  try  to  read  the  protected  resources  from the 
resources of a peer-to-peer client. In order to prevent from such attacks or security violations, 
the requested peer-to-peer security policy is projected onto a SELinux protection policy. Thus, 
the  SELinux mandatory access  control  mechanism helps  to  enforce  the  security policy and 
prevents the web navigator to access to the protected resources but allows the peer-to-peer client 
to access it.
So, the following enforcement is provided:
• peer-to-peer domains are protected against malicious applications
• external applications, such as a video reader, are prevented from violating the requested 
peer-to-peer security policies, such as the confidentiality of video files.
5.1. Projection of the peer-to-peer security properties onto SELinux protection policies
A  dedicated  tool  P2PtoSELinux  has  been  developed  to  convert  the  peer-to-peer  security 
properties  into  consistent  SELinux  policies.  That  tool  takes  a  peer-to-peer  security  policy 
p2p_properties.xml as input and produces a SELinux policy pol_selinux as output.
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The listing 2 shows an extract of a peer-to-peer policy file,  defining a domain name called 
domainA associated to different  security properties and a resource corresponding to the file 
/root/secret.txt that belongs to domain A. That resource has a dedicated property corresponding 
to the cooperation with another domain. This policy is represented on figure 1. The security 
properties of domain A are listed and the dedicated property is written inside the file. Each 
security property is linked to the domain that is concerned by the property.
<policy> 
<domain id="1" name="domainA"> 
  <property type="confidentiality"> 
    <target domainid="3"/> 
  </property> 
  <property type="integrity"/> 
  <property type="cooperation"> 
    <target domainid="4"/> 
  </property> 
</domain> 
<file id="2" path="/root/secret.txt" domainid="1"> 
  <property type="cooperation"> 
    <target domainid="2"/> 
  </property>
</file> 
</policy>
Listing 2. P2P XML Policy.
Figure 1: Policy representation for the XML policy of listing 2
The listing 3 shows an extract  of  the  resulting SELinux protection policy produced by the 
P2PtoSELinux tool. As one can see, a default policy is computed but also dedicated policies for 
the  various  security  properties  i.e.  confidentiality,  integrity,  no  publication,  no  share, 
cooperation and spread. Those protection policies limit the permission for the corresponding 
resources. A peer-to-peer client will use the various corresponding security context according to 
the required domain.  Thus,  a confidential  resource will  be labelled with the Confidentiality 
SELinux  context.  Usually,  the  Confidentiality  context  cannot  be  read  by  any  external 
application such as a video reader since it does not have the required privileges. However, a 
video reader can play a resource protected by the Confidentiality context if it has a satisfying 
SELinux subject context. In order for the end users to read confidential information, they must 
have the corresponding privileges and the application must transmit to a satisfying SELinux 
subject in order to be able to read that information.
Default:
allow file {read write unlink create append mounton rename lock execute geattr setattr}
allow dir {read write unlink search create mounton getattr setattr rename add_name remove_name reparent rmdir}
Confidentiality: Default +
neverallow file {read append setattr}
neverallow dir {read search setattr}
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Integrity: Default +
neverallow file {write unlink append rename setattr}
neverallow dir {write unlink setattr rename remove_name rmdir}
No publication, NoShare: Default +
neverallow file {create setattr mounton}
neverallow dir {create setattr add_name remove_name rmdir mounton}
Cooperatoin, Spread: Default
Listing 3: SELinux rules
5.2. Obtained SELinux protection
The listing 4 shows the trace of a SELinux control associated with the editor vim attempting to 
read  the  file  secret.txt  that  is  protected  by  the  peer-to-peer  Confidentiality  property.  The 
SELinux context system_u:object_r:domainA_t associated to the secret.txt file prevents the vim 
application from the reading access.
So,  that  example  shows  that  an  external  application  such  as  vim  cannot  violate  the 
corresponding peer-to-peer Confidentiality property. Thus, the proposed solution enforces the 
security  of  the  requested  properties  within  the  local  machine,  since  a  malicious  external 
application fails to compromise the peer-to-peer security properties for the local peer-to-peer 
resources.
audit(1229395253.757:369): avc:  denied  { read } for  pid=4241 comm="vim" 
name="secret.txt" dev=sda3 ino=179226 scontext=user_u:user_r:user_t 
tcontext=system_u:object_r:domainA_t tclass=file
Listing 4: SELinux control
6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTATION
We are currently working on the implementation of a peer-to-peer network which can answer 
the requirements of the model of section 3. A first Java simulation of the protocol and trust 
computation has been released.  Moreover,  a  first  implementation of a  peer-to-peer  client  is 
currently available. The user interface will be presented in the second subsection in order to 
show the usage of the security properties. That interface is a front end for the P2PtoSElinux 
tool.  Thus,  the  peer-to-peer  security properties  requested by the  end user  are  automatically 
projected  onto  SELinux,  protecting  the  target  system  from  the  corruption  of  the  other 
applications.
6.1. Trust simulation
Listing 5 shows the simulation code that setup two peers JFL and David. David asks the file 
“contract” to peer JFL that  have the  confidentiality property on the  “ensib” domain.  David 
claims to put the file in the free domain which ensures the spread property.
Listing 6 shows the resulting negotiation between peer JFL and David. It shows the details of 
the computation of the Trust value (Tv) for the two required properties for the domain “ensib” 
against the David policy using its history and challenges: Tv(integrity,David) equals 0.38 and 
Tv(confidentiality,David) equals 0 for the domain “ensib”. This last value forces JFL to refuse 
the resource exchange, because of the value of a fixed threshold (0.2).
// Creating peers, domains, files on JFL side
Domain ensib = new Domain("ensib");
Domain free = new Domain("free");
Resource firefox = new Resource("firefox");
Resource contract = new Resource("contract");
Peer jf = new Peer("JFL");
Peer pc1 = new Peer("C");
Peer pc2 = new Peer("C");
// Initiating the reputation of peer JF
jf.knows(pc1,0.8);
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jf.knows(pc2,0.9);
// Adding resource in domains
jf.add(firefox, free);
jf.add(contract, ensib);
// Applying security properties on domains
Property confid = new Property("confidentiality");
Property integ = new Property("integrity");
Property coop = new Property("cooperation");
jf.add(confid, ensib);
jf.add(integ, ensib);
jf.add(coop, free);
// Creating peers, domains, files on David side
Domain free2 = new Domain("free");
Property spread = new Property("spread");
Peer david = new Peer("David");
david.add(spread,free2);
// Simulation
jf.affiche();
david.affiche();
david.ask(jf, "contract", "free");
Listing 5: Example of simulation code
 [Display JFL] <domain> ensib secured by [confidentiality, integrity]
[Display JFL] <file> contract in ensib under [confidentiality, integrity]
[Display JFL] <file> firefox in free under null
[Display David] <domain> free secured by [spread]
David: I asks to peer JFL the file contract to be put in free
JFL: Peer David asking file contract
JFL: Peer David will put the file in domain free
JFL: File contract found. 
JFL: File is in domain ensib
JFL: Security properties [confidentiality, integrity]
David: someone asking policy for domain free
David: returning policy [spread]
  (Eval) JFL Computation of Eval(David,confidentiality)
  (Eval) JFL Target domain has property spread
  (Eval) JFL the properties of David's free domain hurts the required property confidentiality
  (Eval) Eval(David,confidentiality)=-1
  (Eval) Hist(David,confidentiality)=2
  (Eval) Chal(confidentiality,David)=0.4
  (Eval) EvalHist(confidentiality,David)=0.0
  (Eval) Tv(confidentiality,David)=0.0
  (Eval) Peer refused (0.0<0.2) for confidentiality trust decreased to 0.48
  (Eval) JFL Computation of Eval(David,integrity)
  (Eval) JFL Target domain has property spread
  (Eval) Eval(David,integrity)=0
  (Eval) Hist(David,integrity)=2
  (Eval) Chal(integrity,David)=0.7266666666666667
  (Eval) EvalHist(integrity,David)=0.5
  (Eval) Tv(integrity,David)=0.38524635476491
  (Eval) Peer not fully trusted (0.2<0.38524635476491<0.5) for integrity trust decreased to 0.47
JFL: one of the property is refused: refusing request.
David: peer JFL REFUSED to send the file.
Listing 6: Example of negotiation
A second example is given in listings 7 and 8. This time, the resource firefox is asked by David 
that declares to put it in domain “free”. As the cooperation property does not hurt the spread 
property,  the computation of Tv(cooperation,David) gives 0.44 that is sufficient to allow the 
resource exchange (greater than the fixed threshold 0.2).
//david.ask(jf, ”contract”, ”free”);
david.ask(jf, ”firefox”, ”free”);
Listing 7: Firefox asked by David
[Display JFL] <domain> ensib secured by [confidentiality, integrity]
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[Display JFL] <domain> free secured by [cooperation]
[Display JFL] <file> contract in ensib under [confidentiality, integrity]
[Display JFL] <file> firefox in free under [cooperation]
[Display David] <domain> free secured by [spread]
David: I asks to peer JFL the file firefox to be put in free
JFL: Peer David asking file firefox
JFL: Peer David will put the file in domain free
JFL: File firefox found. 
JFL: File is in domain free
JFL: Security properties [cooperation]
David: someone asking policy for domain free
David: returning policy [spread]
  (Eval) JFL Computation of Eval(David,cooperation)
  (Eval) JFL Target domain has property spread
  (Eval) Eval(David,cooperation)=0
  (Eval) Hist(David,cooperation)=2
  (Eval) Chal(cooperation,David)=0.8500000000000001
  (Eval) EvalHist(cooperation,David)=0.5
  (Eval) Tv(cooperation,David)=0.44243254304683094
  (Eval) Peer not fully trusted (0.2<0.44243254304683094<0.5) for cooperation trust decreased to 0.49
JFL: request accepted.
David: peer JFL accepted to send the file.
Listing 8: Negociation for Firefox
6.2. Peer-to-peer client managing security properties
A peer-to-peer  client  has  been developed using  a  JXTA module  that  provides  peer-to-peer 
primitives (file transfer, connection of new clients). The figure 2 shows the graphical interface 
of the client. It allows to edit the security policy of the local domains and files. The lower left 
window shows the shared files and the domains associated to those files. The right side enables 
to change the security property associated to the file or to the domain. The upper window shows 
the distant shared files or the results of a specific string search.
Figure 2. Graphical interface of the peer-to-peer client
Configuration of the requested security properties is easy through that user interface. Moreover, 
the trust algorithm is completely transparent to the end user.
6.3. P2PtoSELinux performances
The figure 3 shows how the execution time evolves according to the number of considered 
domains.  For  10  domains,  P2PtoSElinux takes  1.67  seconds  to  compute  the  corresponding 
SELinux policy. For 640 domains the execution time takes 2.736 seconds. So, the computation 
time is linear with the number of considered domains when considering more than 100 domains.
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Figure 3: Execution time according to number of domains
6.4. SELinux challenges and traces
As presented previously our architecture uses SELinux traces and challenges to evaluate the 
trust and reputation of the requester. Let us give some examples of the produced challenges and 
traces  associated  with  the  target  resource  secret.txt.  When  a  peer  B  requests  a  resource 
associated with domainA,  peer B sends its  peer-to-peer security policy corresponding to its 
target domain such as presented in listing 2. Thus, a trusted peer C sends to B a challenge such 
as  defined  in  listing  9  in  order  to  request  the  peer-to-peer  client  to  execute  the  vim 
/root/secret.txt command using the subject SELinux context user_u:user_r:user_t. If the peer-to-
peer client that is executed onto B is safe, it should answer with a failed SELinux trace such as 
presented in listing 4.
scontext=user_u:user_r:user_t vim /root/secret.txt
Listing 9. SELinux control
7. PERSPECTIVES
The enforcement of the proposed security properties brings several new perspectives.
First,  conflicting  security  properties  will  bring  conflicting  SELinux  policies,  which  is  not 
acceptable for  SELinux.  A decision engine have to decide how to resolve those conflicting 
policies.
Second,  a  MAC mechanism could  be  integrated  within  the  peer-to-peer  client  itself.  That 
dedicated MAC mechanism would prevent from illegal flows inside a peer-to-peer client  in 
order to deal with a corrupted peer-to-peer client. This MAC mechanism could be based on the 
JAAS module provided by the Java virtual machine that allows to control the access to the 
resources of the system such as the network or the files. Thus, two levels of access control could 
be  setup:  one  fine  grained  access  control  could  be  applied  at  the  software  level,  and  one 
strongest access control at the OS level.
Finally,  large  scale  experimental  results  are  planned  in  order  to  evaluate  the  protocol’s 
robustness. Different experiments will bet setup. First, a simulation of a large network of peers 
will permit to introduce a malicious peer that will violate the policy it claims. This will allow to 
analyze  if  the  system  behave  well  in  a  large  system  with  thousands  of  peers.  Second, 
experiments  are  planned  based  on  our  experience  in  high  interaction  honeypots  [2]  where 
compromised  hosts  are  observed  in  order  to  analyze  attackers  behaviours.  A  peer-to-peer 
honeypot will be setup to invite attackers to try to get resources of the participants, protected by 
security properties. This experiment could help to improve the security of the proposed solution 
analysing the attacks in a real peer-to-peer network.
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